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The case of a Dutch construction company 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In November 2001, a TV program showed that many large Dutch construction companies 
participated in price fixing. We analyze how one such company, Heijmans, reacted to the 
reputation crises after the TV program by introducing a code of conduct. We present the 
outcomes of a questionnaire survey conducted among 140 managers just after the TV program 
with respect to the relevance of such a code and discuss the change in attitude of the CEO of 
Heijmans following after the negative publicity. 
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Introduction 
 
The construction sector in the Netherlands was in the center of publicity during 2002. After a TV 
program by Zembla on 9 November 2001 exposing a clearing system for construction companies 
that colluded in price offers for public works, the Dutch parliament installed in 2002 an 
investigation committee to research these practices. The TV program indicated that the well-
known large Dutch construction companies regularly met in secret just before an offer procedure 
in order to determine which company was cheapest and to increase its price offer. The winning 
company shared the increase in profitability by reserving a compensation for the other 
companies.1 
This practice goes back to the fifties when the Dutch government stimulated a system of 
collusion in the construction sector. One of the reasons for this was the danger that the 
competition on the construction market may become too fierce without such regulation because 
of the large market power of the government, which was by far the largest customer. In 1953, the 
so-called Wegenbouw Aannemers Combination (road construction building contractors 
combination, WAC) was founded. According to rules approved by the Dutch government, the 
WAC organized pre-consultations between the construction companies, in which companies 
communicated their prices. The cheapest company was elected and received the order and 
compensated the other companies for the calculation costs involved in their offers (NCR, 2002a). 
The firm that received the order was also allowed to raise its price in order to reduce the high 
financial risks (Priemus, 2002). This inspired many other construction companies in market 
segments other than road construction to form cartels. In 1963, an organization was founded for 
the entire construction sector (the union of cooperating price-regulating organizations in the 
construction sector, SPO) covering 28 cartels and 4,000 companies in the construction sector. 
The Dutch government also approved of this organization. 
Because companies regularly met each other, this procedure led to other contacts that 
were not in accordance with the rules of the WAC and SPO. Representatives of the companies 
started to meet each other before the WAC consultations to distribute the market. These market 
allocation activities were illegal. Moreover, companies often also succeeded in obtaining 
information from individual government officials about the maximum price that the government 
was prepared to pay for the order. During the illegal pre-consultations, the price of the cheapest 
company was raised accordingly and the difference between the price and the costs was 
distributed among the companies that participated in these illegal pre-consults. The Dutch 
experience also inspired construction companies in other countries, for example, Germany and 
Belgium to form illegal cartels (NRC, 2002a; NRC, 2003). 
 In 1992, the European Commission prohibited the practice of pre-consulting. In 1998, the 
Dutch government implemented this EU regulation and forbade the practice of ex-ante 
consultations (Priemus, 2002). But, as the TV program showed, the practice still continued. 
During this program, Mr. A. Bos, a former director of Koop Tjuchem (one of the large Dutch 
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construction companies), blew the whistle by presenting a hand-written clearing book reporting 
many secret transactions between the large construction companies. The amounts were 
substantial. In addition, Mr. Bos told that several government officials had accepted bribes from 
construction companies for communicating strategic information.  On the basis of a small 
sample, the parliamentary investigation committee estimated in its final report that, owing to this 
practice and other forbidden practices (like using false invoices), the costs of public works were 
about 8,8% higher than they would normally have been, implying a substantial burden to the 
Dutch taxpayer.2 
As a result of this negative publicity, the stock values of large Dutch construction 
companies dropped. This enforced the awareness that a good reputation is of vital importance for 
the financial success of a company. For this paper, we describe the efforts to upgrade ethical 
procedures made by one of the most profitable large Dutch construction companies, Heijmans, 
which was also mentioned in the TV program by Zembla on 9 November 2001. We investigated 
how top and middle managers of this company perceived the usefulness of introducing a code of 
conduct and the kind of code of conduct they would prefer. Our findings highlight the processes 
that take place when companies change their procedures in reaction to negative publicity.  
The content of this paper is as follows. In section 2, we describe the perception of 
Heijmans managers about the ethical standards of Heijmans with respect to the competition in the 
months before the TV program. For this purpose, 12 directors and members of the board of 
Heijmans were interviewed using a scorecard. Section 3 discusses the ethics of collusion and why 
it is seen as harmful. Section 4 discusses the importance of a good reputation as a strategic 
intangible asset and how ethical behaviour impacts upon it. Section 5 deals with the usefulness of 
a written code of conduct for Heijmans as a means of improving the implementation of values 
and its reputation. First, we present the opinion of the CEO before the TV program. Next, we 
describe the results of a questionnaire distributed among 140 managers on a managers’ meeting 
in the week after the TV program. Finally, we describe the CEO’s reaction to the negative 
publicity and the measures taken to restore the company’s reputation, including the introduction 
of a code of conduct. In section 6 we mention some lessons from this case study. 
 
Relationship with competitors: interviews with Heijmans’ top managers  
 
The construction sector has very specific characteristics. In the view of the general public, ethical 
standards are relatively low in the construction sector. Transparency is low, especially for the 
many small companies in this sector. Together with some other labor-intensive sectors (like 
hotels and restaurants, and  the repair of consumer goods), the construction sector is associated 
with the avoidance of taxes and social premiums (Graafland, 1990). Furthermore, the Dutch 
construction sector is known for its high absence rates owing to sickness and disability (EIB, 
2001c). In 1998, for every 100 workers, there were 32 disabled persons in the construction sector 
receiving a disability benefit (EIB, 2001a). The work pressure is high and has risen in the last ten 
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years, whereas it declined in other sectors (EIB, 2001b). 
Heijmans is one of the largest Dutch construction companies. In 2001, Heijmans 
belonged to the five largest Dutch construction companies, whereas its profitability ranked 
among the top three (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2001). The company started as a family company 
in 1923 (Van Empel, 2002). In contrast to other large construction companies in the Netherlands, 
Heijmans has a rather informal culture. The managers of Heijmans dislike formal procedures and, 
in 2001, many had worked for a long time already at Heijmans. Although the company had 
grown to 2,000 employees in 1990 and to almost 10,000 in 2001 (Heijmans, 2002), the managers 
felt that Heijmans gave much personal attention to its employees. They thought that Heijmans 
differed from other large Dutch construction companies that had a more bureaucratic and 
impersonal culture. 
In order to investigate how the managers of Heijmans perceived the ethical quality of 
Heijmans, 12 top managers were interviewed, using a scorecard for about hundred concrete 
ethical aspects, distinguishing six stakeholder groups (employees, suppliers, shareholders, 
competitors, customers and society at large). The advantage of interviews is that this method 
offers the flexibility to ask additional questions in response to the answers of the respondents, 
including questions about opinions and motives. Thus, it provides much insight into the 
perceptions of managers. A disadvantage of interviews is that they are very time consuming. 
Hence, the sample is often limited and not representative for the total group of managers. For this 
reason, we also used a questionnaire, which was distributed among all top and middle 
management (see below).  
The appendix presents an overview of the scores for 37 aspects of corporate social 
responsibility that comprise the hundred more detailed aspects. For this article especially the 
managers’ perceptions with respect to competitors (no price fixing, no trade barriers, no bribes), 
customers (transparent cost calculation), and society at large (compliance with laws, honest 
dealings with politicians) are relevant. During the period just before the negative publicity about 
the secret price agreements, the top managers of Heijmans judged these aspects as rather 
favorable. In particular, the managers of Heijmans reported a relatively high score for market- 
conform price setting. Price fixing seemed to be absent. Also, trade barriers seemed to be no 
major problem. More problematic was the transparency of the cost calculations in offers. Price 
fixing by collusion is only possible if customers are not able to check the reliability of price 
offers. The greater the lack of transparency of the cost calculations, the more room there is for 
demanding more than the actual costs. This might indicate that the top managers of Heijmans 
were already aware of some problems with regard to fair pricing before the public attention 
following the TV program in November 2001. Finally, the managers also judged the relationship 
with government officials as good. They reported that compliance with the law was good and that 
the dealings with politicians were honest. Bribes also seemed to be rare. 
This favorable response contrasts with the information provided by the TV program.  This 
contrast may be explained in two ways. First, the top managers might have willingly given a too-
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favorable view and may not have been prepared to share sensitive information in the interviews. 
Another plausible explanation is that the judgments of the top managers of Heijmans reflect their 
true opinions and must be interpreted in the context of the business culture in Heijmans and the 
Dutch construction sector. For example, one manager told that he knew of illegal price 
agreements in the Dutch construction sector (without indicating whether Heijmans actually 
cooperated in these agreements), but he did not judge them as unethical. The managers of other 
construction companies also expressed this opinion. For example, Mr. Burggraaf, one of the 
contractors that publicly admitted to the illegal practices, did not perceive the illegal pre-
consultations and the resulting distribution of the market as wrong (NRC, 2002a). This indicates 
that, even if Heijmans had been involved in secret price agreements and if the top managers had 
been aware of this, they would probably have regarded these patterns as normal and would not 
have judged them as unethical. As described above, the price agreements had a long and legal 
history and provided a solution to the problem of the large market power of the government as 
main customer of construction products. Moreover, as came out during the public hearings of the 
parliamentary investigation committee, individual companies felt that they had no choice but to 
continue their cooperation in the secret price agreements. Individual construction companies that 
tried to stop this practice by not attending these secret meetings soon learned that their orders 
greatly diminished and were, therefore, forced to continue their cooperation. Several large 
construction companies tried to stop the illegal practices, but failed because too many companies 
were involved (NRC, 2002b). This apparent inability to withdraw gives another reason why 
managers might feel that they cannot be blamed for their cooperation in illegal price agreements. 
This notion can be defended by the argument that, if there are circumstances that make it difficult 
although not impossible for a company to perform a certain act, such mitigating factors lessen its 
responsibility (Velasquez, 1998). Because of the prisoner’s dilemma that individual companies 
faced and in the light of the historical background of these practices, it can be argued that it is 
especially the responsibility of the government and branch organizations at the meso level of the 
construction sector to provide procedures that allow compliance with the EU regulations for fair 
and transparent conditions (the so-called principle of displacement, see Jeurissen (2000), chapter 
5). 
 
Harmful consequences of collusion 
 
If construction companies regarded their price agreements as normal, why did the TV program of 
Zembla damage the reputation of construction companies? There are several moral reasons for 
the public indignation about the secret price agreements. 
 First, according to economic welfare theory the perfect market should be the ideal of 
economic policy because it is efficient. Kath and Rosen (1994, p. 410) formulate the first welfare 
theorem as follows: ‘As long as producers and consumers act as price takers and there is a market 
for every commodity, the equilibrium allocation of resources is Pareto-efficient.’ This theorem 
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reflects the idea of Adam Smith of the ‘invisible hand’ that in pursuing one’s own interest in a 
perfectly competitive market, one automatically attains an optimal social outcome. Price 
agreements between companies reduce the efficiency of the market and are therefore, from a 
utilitarian point of view, objectionable. By price agreements, the companies can function much 
like a giant firm and raise the price above what Smith calls ‘The Natural price’, thus reducing 
consumer surplus and aggregate welfare (Velasques, 1998). The parliamentary investigation 
estimated the price difference at 8,8 %. As prices do not reflect production costs, price agreement 
will also distort the efficient allocation of the resources of the economy (capital and labour) 
among the various industries of a society. Moreover, also the incentive for companies to improve 
the productivity by innovations will decline (dynamic inefficiency). Companies with a low 
productivity can still obtain an income by obtaining compensation from the construction 
company that receives the order. 
 It should be noted that this argument is only partially valid, because the construction 
market is not only distorted by the collusion of the companies, but also by the great market power 
of the government as the main customer of infrastructures. Moreover, as construction companies 
anticipated the price increase agreed upon during the pre-consultations, they often started with 
very competitive and loss-making price offers in order to obtain the order. Still, as noted above, 
the formal pre-consultations induced to other informal contacts that were not in accordance with 
the government regulation and it is highly probable that the net effect of this practice on prices 
has been positive, in particular if informal pre-consultations were combined with other illegal 
actions like using false invoices and paying bribes to obtain information of the available budget 
for government projects.  
 Besides the utilitarian objection that the pre-consultations caused harm to the overall 
welfare of the Dutch society, the pre-consultations and other illegal activities can also be 
convicted from other moral points of view. For example, by lying about the real costs of the 
projects construction companies did not respect the right of freedom and information of their 
customers. Moreover, the practices violate the capitalistic criterion of justice (i.e. benefits be 
distributed according to the value of the contribution the company makes) since customers paid 
too much for their products. Also from a virtue point of view the attempts to seduce government 
officials to communicate secret information about the maximum government budgets by paying 
bribes can be condemned.  
 
Importance of reputation and how ethical behavior impacts upon it 
 
Because of its harmful effects, the publicity about collusion in the construction sector has 
deteriorated the reputation of construction companies. A good reputation is an important 
intangible asset. In order to get a license to operate from their stakeholders and the society as a 
whole, firms have to meet the triple P bottom line expressing the expectations of stakeholders 
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with respect to the company’s contribution to profit, planet and people. Firms that do not meet 
these expectations may see their market shares and profitability go down (McIntosh et al, 1998). 
Evidence shows that customers indeed punish companies if they damage customer’s 
interests. Archer and Wesolowsky (1996) find that owners of durable goods tend to have a 
tolerance towards single negative incidents with regard to product or manufacturer loyalty, but 
are not tolerant towards more than one such incident. Another research shows that a one-point 
increase in the consumer satisfaction index of a Business Week 1000 firm has been calculated to 
be worth about $94 million or 11.4% of the average return on investments (Anderson et al, 
1994). This indicates that the consumers will reward more reliable companies.  
There is also substantial evidence that companies are penalized in the financial markets for 
unethical behaviour (Gunthorpe, 1997; Rao and Hamilton, 1996). A possible explanation for this 
penalizing is that the profitability may decline due to huge fines or compensation payments. 
However, there also seems to be an additional reputational penalty, because the loss in investor 
returns is normally much bigger than expected on the basis of the expected fines and 
compensations (Soppe, 2000). The explanation for a lower share price could be that investors 
perceive more risk of the stock (Badrinath and Bolster, 1996). Most well known are the cases of 
unethical behavior of companies because of illegal activities, like the current gulf of companies 
that violated financial reporting rules. Davidson III et al (1994) find that their shareholders will 
punish companies when they engage in illegal activities. Specific types of crime such as bribery, 
tax evasion, theft of trade secrets, financial reporting violations and violation of government 
contracts were associated with abnormal negative stock market returns. Also illegal price 
agreements belong to this category as illustrated in our case. The stock values of the companies 
mentioned in the TV program fell by more than 10%. 
One way to improve the reputation after a scandal is integrating corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) policies in the company’s strategy. The literature gives several examples of 
companies that successfully adapted a policy of corporate social responsibility after negative 
publicity. For example, after the negative publicity about the Brent Spar and Shell’s operations in 
Nigeria, in which Shell did not succeed in convincing the public of the moral legitimacy of its 
strategy, remarkable changes were adopted in the Shell strategy. From a rather closed 
organisation, it developed into an open organisation using all kinds of instruments to improve its 
relationship with the society (including the publication of a social report audited by external 
accountants and an active dialogue with NGOs like Pax Christi (Gruiters, 2000)). Shell is now at 
the leading edge of business ethics. Another example is C&A, which introduced a code of 
conduct for the supply of merchandise in 1996, after the publication of a report about the use of 
child labor in the Mail on Sunday (8 January 1995). This was the start of an ongoing process of 
professionalization. Being aware that a code of conduct can also damage a company’s reputation 
if the actual situation does not improve, C&A set up in the same year an organization that would 
audit compliance with the code and promote awareness of the code. As shown by Graafland 
(2002a), this organization has been very effective in detecting infringements and improving the 
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labor conditions of C&A’s suppliers. This contributed to the reputation of C&A among NGOs 
(Robbins and Humphrey, 2000). 
These examples show that ethical behavior can improve a company’s reputation. More 
generally, there is much evidence that the reputation of a company is positively related to the 
quality of the CSR policy of a company (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Williams and Barrett, 
2000). Several other studies that investigated the relationship between CSR and profitability 
without explicitly considering the role of reputation, also found that CSR really pays off for 
companies (Burke and Logsdon, 1996; Waddock and Graves, 1997; Ruf et al, 2001).3  
 
Instruments for organizing ethics: A code of conduct 
 
One of the instruments of corporate social responsibility is a code of conduct.4 The central 
research question in our investigation for Heijmans at the time the scandal came out concerned 
the usefulness of a code of conduct for Heijmans. In this section, we first consider the opinion 
expressed by the CEO of Heijmans about a code of conduct for Heijmans before the TV program 
in November 2001. Next, we discuss the outcomes of a questionnaire survey conducted among 
140 top and middle managers in the week following the TV program. Finally, we briefly describe 
the CEO’s view after the negative publicity about price fixing. 
 
The CEO’s previous opinion 
 
From 1 January 1995 until August 2002, Mr. J.P.M. Janssen was the CEO of Heijmans. Although 
not a member of the Heijmans family, Mr. Janssen was able to preserve and embody the informal 
family culture of Heijmans very well. In May 2001, Janssen gave a lecture for 400 businessmen 
at Tilburg University (Janssen, 2001). In this lecture, he argued that the ethical quality of a 
company is not the result of obeying rules, but is rather determined by what employees ‘have 
between their ears’. He especially stressed the role of the leader of the company, who should 
embody the values of the company by his deeds. In his lecture, Janssen rejected the usefulness of 
a formal written code of conduct. Paraphrasing Seneca, he stated, ‘Golden bridles do not improve 
a horse.’ If an entrepreneur does not have a virtuous character, then rules will not help. The rules 
of written codes of conduct only stimulate minimal compliance. Instead, Janssen expected more 
from entrepreneurs showing integrity, who express the values of the companies by their deeds. 
Such managers are also able to communicate these values to their subordinates who, in turn, 
communicate these standards to lower levels in the organization. At that time, Janssen expected 
that this informal way of communicating values would be sufficiently effective in implementing 
high ethical standards in a large organization. 
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The opinion of top managers and middle managers just after the TV program 
 
In the week after the TV program by Zembla on 9 November 2001, in which Heijmans was also 
named as one of the large companies participating in the illegal price agreements, Heijmans 
organized a meeting for all its managers at top and middle management level. Almost all 
managers were present. This meeting took place during the research to the usefulness of a code of 
conduct for Heijmans and after the interviews with Heijmans top managers. The management day 
provided an excellent opportunity to distribute a questionnaire about the usefulness of a code of 
conduct and the type of code that the Heijmans managers would prefer. As the meeting took 
place one week after the TV program, all managers were highly interested in the subject. This 
explains the high rate of respondents : the number of completed questionnaires was 140, which 
covered more than 90 percent of all top and middle managers of Heijmans. Thus, the outcomes 
are representative for the whole group of top and middle management of Heijmans. Table 1 gives 
an overview of the results. 
 
Table 1 Results of questionnaire among 140 managers of Heijmans 
1 What is your opinion on the introduction of a code of conduct for Heijmans? 
a. positive       81   
b neutral       17  
c negative       2 
 
2 What function should a code of conduct have? 
    very important important   moderately important  unimportant              meana 
- to make company values explicit  37  59  4  0  2.33 
- to improve internal management of ethics 31  56  10  3  2.15 
- empowerment of employees  36  53  10  1  2.24 
- to improve image    46  37  13  4  2.25 
 
3 What characteristics would you prefer for a code of conduct for Heijmans> 
- basic values (versus concrete behavioural norms)    65  
- ambitious (versus non-ambitious)     76 
- only internally available (versus also externally available)   23 
- with legal status (versus no legal status)     60 
 
4 If you had to develop a code of conduct for Heijmans, what kind of process would you prefer? 
a top-down       18 
b down-top       5 
c combination of both      77 
 
5 If Heijmans were to introduce a code of conduct, should compliance with the code be monitored and infringements be punished? 
a yes       62   
b neutral       31   
c no       7   
 
6 Are you prepared to attend a short course to learn how to apply the code in practise? 
a yes       51 
b neutral       33 
c no       17 
 
a By weighting the options (very important: 3; important 2; moderately important 1; unimportant 0) 
 
The results show that a large majority was positive about developing a code of conduct for 
Heijmans. Notwithstanding the traditional reluctance to follows formal procedures, the negative 
publicity and the resulting decline of the stock value of Heijmans after the TV program (by about 
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15%) made Heijmans managers aware of the importance of corporate social responsibility for 
Heijmans. A written code of conduct could probably help to restore the confidence of the 
customers and the public at large in Heijmans. 
This is weakly confirmed by the reactions to the second question about the function that a 
code of conduct would have to perform. Hummels and Karssing (2000) distinguish several 
functions of social and ethical accountability, for example, 
- Explication of values and norms. Codes of conduct clarify the policy of the company. It 
shows what the company expects from its management and employees. The reflection on 
values and norms will also help to reduce inconsistencies in the policy of the company; 
- Instrument for the management to improve the ethical standards, to solve ethical 
dilemmas and to prevent moral conflicts; 
- Empowerment of employees by strengthening their moral consciousness; 
- Improves the image of the company and the dialogue with external stakeholders. The 
stakeholders know from the code of conduct what they may expect from the company. 
As shown by Table 1, the percentage of managers that considered improving the public image of 
the company to be very important is 46%, which is higher than for other functions. On the other 
hand, there is least consensus about this function of a code of conduct: there is also a relative 
high number of managers that consider the image function to be of moderate importance or 
unimportant compared to other functions. This may be interpreted as a signal that some managers 
think that a code of conduct may not convince the public of Heijmans’ good intentions and that 
priority should first be given to the internal functions of a conduct. Only after Heijmans has 
improved the ethical standards internally, it will be ready to signal its standards to the society by 
a public code of conduct. On average, the image function was judged as the second important 
function. 
The most important function is the explication of values. This is understandable, as 
Heijmans had taken over many other companies in the previous 10 years. As a result, it had 
grown from about 2,000 to 10,000 employees. However, by taking over other firms, Heijmans 
also imported strange company cultures. A clear awareness of Heijmans values therefore tends to 
weaken. Moreover, if a company becomes very large, it can no longer be assumed that informal 
channels are sufficient to communicate the company values. Therefore, the communication needs 
to be strengthened by formal means like a code of conduct.  Furthermore, the table shows that 
empowerment of managers and the improvement of the management function were also 
considered important.  
The third question refers to the characteristics of the code of conduct that Heijmans 
managers would prefer. When developing a code, an organization is confronted with a set of 
choices regarding the content of the code (Kaptein and Wempe, 1998). First, global formulations 
of the basic values of the company or concrete rules of behavior can be chosen. A disadvantage 
of the second option is that not all actions can be incorporated in rules. Therefore, a code must 
also make explicit the considerations behind the actions that enable organization members to act 
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with integrity in line with the basic values of the company. This probably explains the preference 
of Heijmans managers for the broad formulations of core values.  
Second, a code can describe the actual situation or it can aim at improving moral behavior 
and define ambitious targets. For example, if one uses concrete rules, one could follow a safe 
strategy by formulating rules that reflect the already existing practices of the company. 
Alternatively, one could formulate rules that differ from the already existing practices and reflect 
a commitment to improve them. For example, when C&A introduced a code of conduct for the 
supply of merchandise in 1996, it included a rule that the use of child labour is absolutely 
unacceptable. At that time, the audit organization of C&A, SOCAM, now and then still detected 
child labour during inspections of the C&A’s suppliers. It was only after some years, that 
SOCAM did not detect any child labour anymore. Naturally, the code should correspond as much 
as possible to the concrete problems encountered in actual situations. However, when the code is 
too closely linked to current standards, it does not motivate the staff to improve their behavior. 
Moreover, when the organization is in a process of transition, it might be necessary to rewrite it 
too often. On the other hand, if the gap between the ideals in the code and reality is too great, the 
code loses its motivating and stimulating effect, too. Heijmans managers preferred the first 
option. Confronted with negative publicity, they apparently wanted to improve the situation and, 
therefore, wanted a code of conduct that would stimulate this process.  
Another choice concerns the publication of the code. If the main function of the code of 
conduct is to improve the internal management of ethical standards, an internal code for 
employees suffices. On the other hand, if the company wants to improve its reputation and 
restore its credibility by communicating its commitment to its values to the general public, an 
external code is required. As expected, the Heijmans managers clearly preferred the latter option.  
The last aspect of the character of the code concerns the legal status of the code of 
conduct. Although a company can voluntarily choose to introduce a code of conduct, it can 
generate legal duties for internal and external stakeholders. According to Galle (2000), the legal 
status of a code of conduct depends on the character of the code. In particular, the legal status of 
a code of conduct is stronger if: 
- the code communicates concrete rules and clear minimum requirements that should be 
met 
- the code is consequently applied by the management and functions in the daily practice of 
the company. If the code of conduct remains a simple paper commitment without real 
force, its legal status is weak 
- the code is complemented by procedures that foster compliance with the code, like the 
presence of an ethics officer, an ethical committee, auditing, social reporting, and a 
systematic distribution of the code 
- the code explicitly refers to national or international laws or specific legal agreements 
- the rules in the code of conduct are accepted in the branch as being in accordance with 
good entrepreneurship 
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Unexpectedly, a majority of the Heijmans managers preferred a code of conduct with a legal 
status. This outcome is inconsistent with the response given by most managers that they would 
prefer ambitious formulations and basic values to minimum requirements and concrete rules. 
This outcome can, therefore, better be interpreted as a sign of serious commitment to the code. 
This is also confirmed by the answers to the fifth question, which show that a majority supported 
procedures that foster compliance with the code of conduct. 
The fourth question refers to the type of process the Heijmans managers would prefer 
when introducing a code of conduct. One option is that the top management appoints a small 
team that looks at other codes of conduct and constructs a code that fits the values and norms of 
the company, which the board approves. However, such a rapid top-down process has several 
disadvantages. First, it is doubtful whether the team that constructs such a code is aware of all 
relevant moral problems at all levels in the firm, and whether solutions already exist. Second, the 
code will only reflect the opinions of a small group of people within the firm. Many workers are 
not involved and hence not committed to the code. As Marnburg (2000) argues, the effectiveness 
of a code of conduct depends crucially on the ability of workers to identify with the code. This 
means that people from all levels have to be involved in the process of preparing the code. If this 
process succeeds in creating commitment among all relevant stakeholders, then the code may 
have a substantial impact on actual behavior in the company. Several studies have shown that the 
presence of an ethical infrastructure including a code of conduct improves the integrity of 
managers and workers (Vardi, 2001; Adams et al 2001). On the other hand, the commitment of 
the top managers of the company is also important. This is confirmed by research in the United 
States (Van Luijk, 2000). The leaders of the company must embody the intentions of the code of 
conduct and be prepared to be accountable for their own behavior. The Heijmans managers 
seemed to be aware of the importance of the commitment of both top managers and employees in 
lower ranks and preferred an interactive process in which the top of the company would take the 
lead and expressed its commitment, but in which managers and workers in lower ranks would 
also be able to express their opinion and give feedback before the code is finalized and 
introduced.  
As already mentioned, the fifth question refers to the type of strategy for organizing ethics 
that Heijmands managers wanted. There are several ways of defining and organizing ethical 
behavior. Building on the work of Sharp Paine (1994), Hummels and Karssing (2000) distinguish 
three types of strategies. In the first strategy - the compliance strategy - the company develops 
concrete standards of behavior, which are communicated to all members of the organization. The 
focus is on required behavior (Trevino and Nelson, 1999). Supervision of the behavior of the 
managers and employees or other business partners guarantees the ethical quality of the 
organization partners. Those who are found shirking are punished. The second strategy - the 
integrity strategy - does not rely on compliance with strict rules, but rather on the responsibility 
and integrity of the individual employees on the basis of internalized values. The third strategy - 
the dialogue strategy - pays attention to the expectations of the stakeholders of the company. This 
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strategy focuses on responsiveness to the ideas, interests and values of others. The responses to 
question 3 indicate that the Heijmans managers favoured a code of conduct that would reflect 
basic values rather than concrete norms. This implies an integrity strategy with a focus on values. 
In contrast, the responses to question 5 suggest that the Heijmans managers also wished to see 
that compliance with the code of conduct be guaranteed by procedures to monitor the employees’ 
behavior. This is in line with the responses to the last aspect of question 3, which show that the 
Heijmans managers preferred a code of conduct with a legal status. Taking these different 
responses together, it seems that the Heijmans managers were reluctant to implement a code of 
conduct with too many concrete norms, but that they were also aware that the code of conduct 
should be confirmed by corresponding behavior in order to convince the public of the sincerity of 
Heijmans. This is also reflected by the responses to the last question. Notwithstanding the high 
work pressure, a majority of Heijmans managers was prepared to follow a short course in order to 
learn how to apply the values and norms of the code of conduct in daily practice. Finally, it 
should be noted that the answers to questions 2 and 5 do not provide insight into the managers’ 
opinions with respect to the value of the dialogue strategy. Although the responses to question 3 
show that the Heijmans managers supported the introduction of a public code of conduct that 
would be available to external stakeholders, it is unclear whether this choice was motivated by 
the desire to improve dialogue with these external stakeholders. 
In addition to the questions reported in Table 1, the questionnaire included two questions 
related to some personal characteristics of the respondents (age and tenure) and one open 
question about the type of subjects to be dealt with in the code of conduct. We found no 
systematic differences between old and young managers nor with respect to tenure. The only 
notable difference was that older workers seemed to be relatively more in favor of a compliance 
strategy than younger workers. 
Table 2 presents a list of subjects mentioned by the respondents to be included in the code 
of conduct. Most managers mentioned general values like reliability, integrity, clarity, honesty, 
and openness. This is understandable because of the damaged image of Heijmans after the TV 
program by Zembla and the consequent decline in the stock value of Heijmans by 15 %. 
Although these general values relate to all stakeholders, in the context of the public attention for 
collusion in the construction sector, they are particularly relevant to the relationship with society 
at large (including the government) and customers. This is confirmed by the values that relate 
more specifically to these two stakeholder groups, like being a good example, having transparent 
offer procedures (and cost calculations), and offering no gifts to government officials. In 
addition, values related to employee relations were often mentioned. The high priority given to 
good employee relationships and the commitment of employees can be explained by the fact that 
good relational contacts are crucial for the success of a construction company (Kay, 1993). If 
workers trust each other, they are more prepared to share knowledge and this increases the 
synergy within the organization, because shared knowledge is more productive than the sum of 
the expertise of individual workers (Boxall, 1996). In addition, the commitment of workers has a 
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positive influence on the profitability of the total company by diminishing the use of costly 
explicit control mechanisms and increasing the flexibility of the organisation. Furthermore, good 
people management motivates workers to make greater efforts and to share their creativity with 
the company. This raises the productivity of workers and also contributes to the profitability of 
the company. A final advantage of good people management is that committed workers are less 
inclined to leave the company (Huselid, 1995). For example, Brouwer et al (2001) found that 
paying attention to the problems of older workers reduces the number of workers that leave the 
company. As many workers have unique and valuable competencies that are difficult to 
reproduce, it might be hard and costly to find new suitable candidates. 
 
 
Table 2 Subjects suggested for the code of conduct (number of times mentioned) 
 
General values 142 
 
Reliability 29 
Integrity 24 
Clarity 24 
Honesty 20 
Openness 19 
Cooperativeness 7 
Consistency 7 
Respect 4 
Trust 3 
Image 2 
Own value 2 
Realism 2 
Professionalism 1 
Safety 1 
Certainty 1 
 
Employees 33 
 
Good social relationships 16 
Commitment 5 
Sanctioning of unethical behavior  4 
Good fellowship 3 
Communication 2 
Equal opportunities for minorities  1 
Privacy 1 
Challenging work 1 
 
Customers 21 
 
Transparent offer procedures 10 
No offering/acceptance of gifts 8 
Good relationship  4 
High product quality 4 
High service 3 
 
Competitors 
 
Good relationship 1 
 
 
Society 23 
 
Being a good example 11 
Contribute to social values 7 
Market-conform operating 3 
Compliance with law 1 
No bribes 1 
Compliance with fiscal duties 1 
 
 
 
Shareholders 11 
 
Acquisition and synergy 5 
Profitability 3 
Risk management 1 
Stable stock value 1 
Corporate governance 1 
 
Suppliers  
 
Good relationship 4 
 
 
The CEO’s current opinion 
 
Soon after the TV program by Zembla, the CEO of Heijmans, Mr. Joop Janssen, announced two 
specific measures. First, he decided to engage an external accountant of KPMG who would 
attend meetings at which the price offers of were made by Heijmans managers and ensure that no 
secret price dealings were agreed.5 Second, Janssen decided that all Heijmans managers involved 
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in making price offers should sign a document, in which they declare that they will not cooperate 
in illegal price dealings. Both measures are examples of the compliance strategy. First, the 
standard was communicated very clearly by having the managers sign a document that informed 
them well of the norm that cooperation in illegal price agreements was absolutely forbidden. 
Second, the KPMG officer must control the behavior of the Heijmans managers. If he finds 
evidence of ongoing secret price dealings, he will report that to the board of Heijmans and the 
manager will risk disciplinary measures. 
In addition to these specific measures, Mr. Janssen also changed his opinion on the 
usefulness of a written code of conduct. The argument that a large company that has taken over 
many other companies needs formal instruments to enforce the informal communication of 
values and norms convinced him of the necessity of a written code of conduct. The illegal price 
agreements in the construction sector and the damaged reputation of Heijmans further increased 
the incentive to professionalize the ethical procedures in Heijmans. However, Mr. Janssen stated 
that he was aware that a code of conduct does not guarantee responsible behavior. Although it 
may be a useful instrument, he said he still believed that ethical standards are closely related to 
the company’s culture and the attitudes of the top management, individual managers, and 
employees (ND, 2002). 
 
Some lessons  
 
What can we learn from this case study?  
First, the interviews with the top managers of Heijmans indicate that managers do not 
consider certain practices to be unethical if these practices have existed for a long time and are 
accepted within the sector. As my interviews with top managers of Heijmans before the TV 
program of Zembla suggest, these managers believed that the ethical quality of the relationship of 
Heijmans with its customers (including no price fixing) and the society at large was high. 
Although one manager explained that he was aware of the illegal price agreements going on in 
the construction sector, he did not feel that construction companies could be blamed. Given the 
historical background in which consultation between companies was formally allowed and given 
the sectoral culture in which most companies accepted ongoing secret dealings after the legal 
prohibition of these practices, individual managers did not consider them to be unethical. It was 
only after the publication and the strong indignation of society that managers in the construction 
sector started to realize that their everyday practices may indeed be unethical and had to change.  
Second, the case illustrates the well-known phenomenon of negative publicity playing an 
important role in changing the CSR policy of a company. Similar to the cases of Shell and C&A 
discussed above, the negative publicity on price fixing induced an important change in Heijmans. 
First, it reacted specifically to the criticism by hiring external auditors to monitor the practice of 
making price offers. The negative publicity also changed the company’s ideas about the 
usefulness of a code of conduct. Whereas the CEO of Heijmans did not believe in the usefulness 
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of such an instrument before the Zembla program, he changed his view after the negative 
publicity. Although it is still not clear whether this change in attitude will turn out to be more 
than a simple public relations tactic, the public code of conduct may be a good starting point 
because it enables stakeholders to appeal to the values of Heijmans and invites them to ask 
questions about the realization of the intentions communicated in the code of conduct. Providing 
convincing answers might require a further professionalization of ethical procedures by 
Heijmans. 
Third, the empirical research to the managers’ views on a code of conduct shows that 
Heijmans’ managers and the CEO of Heijmans are aware that the code should not only contain 
rules, but also values that motivate to a change in attitude. The contrast between the top 
managers’ view on illegal price agreements before the scandal and the response of the public 
after the TV program makes evident that the business culture has to change.6 This requires a 
change in attitude that cannot be attained by a compliance strategy only. On the other hand, the 
managers are also aware that the communication of values is only credible if behavioral patterns 
will reflect these values. In order to insure that manager behave in accordance to the proclaimed 
values, the CEO also decided to enforce compliance to the most urgent rules with respect to the 
procedures of price offers. Since the Dutch society’s trust in the construction sector has been 
severely damaged, restoring the reputation may take a long time and only take place if the 
company proves that it lives up to the values included in the code of conduct, like reliability, 
integrity, clarity and honesty. 
Even if Heijmans will live up to these values in the coming years, one can doubt whether 
the code of conduct of Heijmans (which was published in February 2003) will restore Heijmans’ 
reputation as long as Heijmans and other construction companies do not reveal all information 
about collusion in the past. All construction companies involved in the scandal have yet been 
very cautious with revealing information about price deals in the past, because of the possible 
negative legal consequences. As new evidence about secret price agreements during the period 
from 1998 to 2001 is still coming out, the distrust against construction companies has not 
disappeared yet. For example, when on February 14 th  2004 new information was published 
about illegal price agreements in another segment of the construction sector (namely the 
construction of hospitals and schools), the stock value of Heijmans declined again by 4 % (NRC, 
2004a). The head of the investigation committee of the Dutch parliament, Ms. M. Vos, demanded 
that the construction sector make public all cases of illegal price increments in the past. Until 
now, few construction companies have done so.7  
 Finally, the case study illustrates the importance of industry-wide regulation of offer 
procedures in the construction sector. It can be validly argued that individual managers and 
companies are not the only agents to be blamed for participating in illegal price dealings. Several 
attempts were made by companies to stop the illegal practice, but these companies found that it 
was extremely difficult to change the system individually because there was a high probability of 
losing orders (NRC, 2002b). They were all captives of the system. Although this mitigating 
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factor does not completely take away the responsibility of individual managers and companies to 
try to change the situation - for example, by communicating the problem to branch organizations 
and the government - the case shows that sector organizations in the construction sector as well 
as the government did not do enough to restructure the offer procedures after the prohibition of 
the existing procedure in 1992 by the European Commission. Another reason for blaming the 
government is that the illegal forcing up of prices was also facilitated by the lack of integrity of 
government officials who provided information about the prices that the government was 
prepared to pay. 
 
Appendix Results of interviews with 12 top managers of Heijmans 
 
The top managers were asked to classify Heijmans in respect of these concrete ethical aspects, 
choosing from four options: very high ethical quality (score 4), high ethical quality (score 3), 
moderate ethical quality (score 2), and low ethical quality (score 1). The results are reported by 
Table A1. 
Table A1 shows no large discrepancies between the ethical qualities of various 
stakeholder relations. Especially the shareholder relations were relatively good. Heijmans paid 
much attention to several aspects of the relationship with the shareholders. In 1993, Heijmans 
received a stock-exchange notation in Amsterdam. Heijmans had a stringent internal provision 
for top managers that forbade insider trading. Another notable point is the high quality of the 
annual financial report of Heijmans. Both in 1997 and in 2002, Heijmans won the prestigious 
Henry Sijthoff price for the best annual report of companies with a notation at the stock exchange 
in Amsterdam in the category ‘Other funds’ (FD, 2002). Furthermore, the relationship with 
society at large (including the government) was also considered to be relatively good. Especially 
corporate citizenship received a high mark. The managers gave several examples of sponsoring 
of local community activities. Furthermore, Heijmans’ efforts to reduce environmental damage 
were good. Using a detailed score card on environmental aspects developed by the Stichting 
Bouwresearch and consulting environmental experts of Heijmans, it was estimated that Heijmans 
belonged to the best category (‘most aware of environment’). Only compliance with the tax law 
received an average mark below 3. 
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Table A1 Scores for corporate social responsibility of Heijmansa 
 
Employees (average: 2.7) 
 
Aspect 
 
just 
remuneration 
 
fair 
opportunities 
 
open 
communication 
 
participatory 
management 
 
role of unions 
 
integrity 
 
average score 
 
3.0 
 
2.8 
 
2.4 
 
2.5 
 
2.4 
 
2.9 
 
Aspect 
 
privacy 
 
commitment 
 
balanced 
leisure/ working 
time 
 
employability 
 
challenging 
work 
 
procedures 
 
average score 
 
3.3 
 
2.8 
 
2.0 
 
3.0 
 
3.3 
 
2.2 
 
Suppliers (average: 2.9) 
 
Aspect 
 
respect for local 
culture 
 
honest trade 
relations 
 
labor conditions 
of suppliers 
 
product and 
environmental 
safety of 
suppliers 
 
transparency of 
suppliers 
 
no exclusive 
dealing 
agreements with 
suppliers 
 
average score 
 
3.0 
 
3.0 
 
3.0 
 
3.0 
 
2.5 
 
3.0 
 
Shareholders (average: 3.1)  
 
Aspect 
 
profitability 
 
risk 
management 
 
corporate 
governance 
  
 
 
average score 
 
3.0 
 
3.0 
 
3.3 
  
 
 
Competitors (average: 2.9) 
 
 
Aspect 
 
no misleading 
advertisements 
 
No price fixing 
 
no trade barriers 
 
no exclusive 
dealing 
agreements with 
customers 
 
no bribes 
 
respect of 
intellectual 
property of 
competitors 
 
average score 
 
3.0 
 
3.6 
 
2.8 
 
3.0 
 
3.5 
 
1.6 
 
Customers (average: 2.8) 
 
Aspect 
 
product quality 
 
honest product 
information 
 
transparent cost 
calculation 
 
confidential 
treatment of 
customer 
 
living up to 
contractual 
duties 
 
respect for 
customer 
 
average score 
 
3.2 
 
3.0 
 
2.4 
 
3.0 
 
2.8 
 
2.3 
 
Society at large (average: 3.1) 
 
Aspect 
 
compliance with 
laws 
 
transparency 
 
honest dealings 
with politicians 
 
Sustainability 
 
corporate 
citizenship 
 
no tax evasion 
 
average score 
 
3.0 
 
3.1 
 
3.3 
 
3.0 
 
3.3 
 
2.7 
a
 Scores range from 1 (low ethical quality) to 4 (very high ethical quality) and are based on 12 interviews with top 
managers of Heijmans using a score card with 100 concrete aspects of CSR 
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1
 That means that no money was actually paid. A clearing system was used to clear these reservations (or so-
called Mickey Mouse money).  
2
 This seems implausibly high, because the profit rate of construction companies is relatively low.  Assuming 
that the share of undeclared profits is relatively small for large construction companies, it seems that part of the 
price increase was used to finance the calculation costs of  making price offers. 
3
 There are, however, several other studies that find a neutral or negative relationship between profitability and 
CSR (Mc Williams and Siegel, 2001). For an economic theoretical model of CSR, reputation and performance, 
see Graafland (2002b). 
4
 Other instruments are ISO or other certifications, social reports, social audits, social handbook, confidential 
person or ethical committee and ethical training. See Graafland et al (2003). 
5
 It should be noted that the effectiveness of this measure can be questioned, because of the recent record of 
accounting firms like KPMG. Also in the case of the illegal price agreements in the Dutch construction sector, 
accountants were accused of cooperating with construction companies to hide these practices (NRC, 2002c).   
6
 Currently the Dutch branch organization of the construction sector, AVBB, provides courses to stimulate the 
required change in attitudes in the construction sector.  
7
 The NMa, the anti-trust organization of the Dutch government, has offered companies an opportunity to give 
information about illegal practices in exchange for a reduction in the penalty. Until now only a few construction 
companies have made use of this facility (NRC, 2004b).  
